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[fol. 1]
IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

F. J. CHRESTENSEN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
against
LEWIS J. VALENTINE, Individually and as Police Commissioner of New York City, Defendant-Appellant
STATEMENT UNDER RULE XIII
This action was instituted by the filing of the complaint
on July 22, 1940 and the issuance of a summons on the same
day, copies of which were served on the defendant Lewis
J. Valentine on July 23rd, 1940. Issue was joined by the
service of the defendant's answer on August 9th, 1940.
An agreed statement of facts was entered into between the
parties on November 4th, 1940 and the cause was tried before
Hon. Murray Hulbert, U. S. District Judge on the same
day. A decree entered December 13, 1940 declared invalid
Section 318 of the Sanitary Code of the City of New York
insofar as .it applied to the distribution by plaintiff or his
agents of commercial handbills upon the streets, sidewalks
and public places of New York City and granted the plaintiff a permanent injunction for that part of the relief demanded in the complaint.
The Notice of Appeal was filed in the office of the Clerk
o£ the District Court on March 8th, 1941.
The plaintiff's attorneys of record are Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, Esqs.
The defendant is represented by William C. Chanler,
Corporation Counsel of the City of N ew York.
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[fo1. 2]

IN DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEw YORK
Civil Action
File No.9

498

F. J. OHItESTENSEN, Plaintiff',
V8.

LEWIS J. VALENTINE, Individually and as Police Commi8sioner of New York City, Defendo/nt
SUMMONS
To the above named Defendant:
You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon
Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, plaintiff's attorneys,
whose address 32 Liberty St., N. Y. City, an amrWCl' to the
complaint which is herewith served upon you, within 20
days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive of
the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in
the complaint.
Date, July 22, 1940.
George J. H. Follmer, Clerk of Court. (Seal.)

[fol.3]

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
COMPLAINT

To the Honorable, the Judges of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York:
The plaintiff, by his attorneys, Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, alleges, upon information and belief, as
follows:

,

1. Jurisdiction is founded upon the fact tba t this is it suit
of a civil nature, in equity, to redress the deprivation,
under color of state law, ordinance and regulation of rights,
privileges and immunities, secured by the Constitution of
the United States and of rights secured by laws of the United

3

States providing for equal rights of citizens of the United
States and of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States. Also, the amount in controversy exceeds Three
thousand ($3,000) Dollars; there is diversity of citizenship
and the suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
2. Plaintiff is a citizen of Florida and of the United
States, residing at Jacksonville, Florida, and is the owner
of former United States Navy Submarine S-49.
3. The defendant, Lewis J. Valentine, is Police Commissioner of New York City, and is a citizen of New York.
4. For some time past the Police Commissioner of New
York City, through members of the Police Department, pa1'ticularly Captain Edward J. Lennon of the Second Precinct, has restrained the plaintiff from distributing a ce1'tain handbill, a copy of which is attached hereto and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit A, in the streets and on- the sidewalks
in New York City, including the streets and sidewalks
adjoining Battery Park, pursuant to certain ordinances or
[fol. 4] regulations of New York City set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 hereof, and have threatened to arrest any
employee of plaintiff who distributed said handbill.
5. For some time past the Police Commissioner of New
I y ork City, through members of the Police Department, particularly Captain Edward J. Lennon of the Second Precinct,
has restrained plaintiff's employee sandwich men from walking on the sidewalks and in the streets adjacent to Battery
Park in New York City pursuant to a regulation Of the
Department of Parks of New York City, set forth in paragraph 7 hereof, and have compelled said sandwich men to
depart from said sidewalks and streets.
6. Section 318 of the Sanitary Code of New York City
provides as follows:
"No person shall throw, cast or distribute or cause or
permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill,
circular, card, booklet, placard or other advertising matter
whatsoever, in or upon any street or public place, or in a
front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the vestibule or any hall of any building or in a letterbox therein;
provided that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to

f'
•
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o

prohibit or otherwise regulate the delivery of any such rna ttel' by the United States postal service, or prohibit the distribution of sample copies of newspapers regularly sold by
the copy or by annual subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the lawful distribution of anything other
than commercial and business advertising matter."
7. Article II, Sec. 6 of the Park Regulations of New
York City, provides as follows:
"No person shall post any bill, placard, 1l0tic0 or other
paper upon any structure, tree, rock, article or thing within
[fo1. 5] within any park, or upon any park street, or paint
or affix thereon, in any other way, any advertisement, notice or exhortation. No person shall distribute, hand out,
deliver, place, cast about or leave about any bill, billboard,
ticket, handbill, card, placard, circular, pamphlet or display any flag, banner, transparency, target, sign, placard
or any matter for advertising purposes, or operate any
musical instrument or drum within any park or upon any
park street, or cause any noise to be made for advertising
purposes or for the purpose of attracting attention to any
exhibition, pel'formance, show or other purpose, within any
park or upon any park street. The placing, or using for
any other purpose than reading of newspapers, or other
papers on the beaches or boardwalks, on the lawns or
beaches of public parks is prohibited."
8. The l1lllawful acts of the defendant, which defendant
threatens to repeat continuously as against the plaintiff
and his employees and agents, violate the rights of the
plaintiff under the following provisions of the Constitution
and the Laws of the United States:
(a) The provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
,Amendment to the United States Constitution that "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, libel'ty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law::;";
(b) Section 1979 of the Revised Statute8, con8titutillg
section 43 of Title 8 of the United States Code providing:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,

,,
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subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
[fo1. 6] States 01' other person within the jurisdiction
thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress." Under these provisions, basic civil liberties, including freed/om of the
press, are guaranteed against infringement.
9. Plaintiff has suffered by the acts of said defendant,
and will continue to suffer from the acts threatened by defendant, serious and irreparable injury to his property and
personal rights and immunities whereas defendant, if restrained as hereinafter prayed, will be enjoined merely from
the commission of unlawful acts and will be confined to the
lawful discharge of his duties as an officer of New York
City, and will suffer no damage to his person or official
rights.
10. Plaintiff is without adequate remedy in courts of
law because a multiplicity of arrests with appeals from convictions for violations of the ordinance and regulation in
question would result in such delay that any remedy finally
obtained would be of no help to the plaintiff, and therefore
prays:
(1) That the defendant, Lewis J. Valentine, individually
and as Police Commissioner of New York City, may answer
this bill of complaint and each statement therein made.
(2) That the defendant and his subordinates, or any of
them, be perpetually restrained and enjoined by the injunction of this court as follows:
(a) From interfering in any manner with the plaintiff
or his agents in the distribution by them of the handbill
attached to persons willing to receive the same on the public
streets and sidewalks and other public places of New York
City.
[fo1. 7] (b) From interfering in any manner with the
plaintiff's employee sandwich men using the public streets
and sidewalks and other public places in New York City.
(3) That the defendant and his subordinates, or any of
them, be perpetually restrained and enjoined by the injunction of this court from enforcing or attempting to enforce

.
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the ordinances or regulations of New York City described
in the bill of complaint, in any manner whatsoever which
may constitute interferences of the nature 80ught to be restrained and enjoined in the preceding prayer.
(4) That plaintiff may have such other and further relief

as to this Honorable Court may be deemed just and equitable
in the premises.
(5) That a writ or writs of subpoena may imme command-

ing defendant to answer this bill of complaint and to abide
by such decr'ee as this Honorable Court may make in the
•
premIses.
Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, by V\:r alter
W. Land, Office and Post Office Address, X o. 32
Liberty Street, Borough of :Manhattal1, City of
New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
.

, -=- ",' _"oc

Pr.AINTIFF'S EXHIDIT " A' ,

ANNEXED TO COMPLAINT

This exhibit constitutes a handbill which i;.l hereinafter
reproduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit A annexed to the Agreed
Statement of Facts at page 24 of this record.

[fol. 8]

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT DOURT
ANSWER

Defendant, Lewis J. Valentine, individually and as Police
Commissioner of New York City, fiIN; thi8, his answer, to
the complaint herein:
First Defense:
1. The complaint fails to state a claim against the defend-

ant upon which relief can be granted.
Second Defense:
2. This Court is without jurisdiction over the Rubjcct
matter of the controvel'sv
herein
.
•
3. Answering paragraph "1" of the complaint defendant admits the allegation of diversity of citizcl18hip; lacks

7

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegation that the amount in controversy
exceeds three thousand dollars; and denies each and every
other allegation contained therein.
Third Defense:
4. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs "2", "3", "4", "6" and "7" of the complaint.
5. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph "5" of the complaint in so far as those allegations
are consistent with the fact that the sidewalks and streets
therein mentioned are within Battery Park and under the
lawful authority and jurisdiction of the Commissioner of
Parks of New York City.
.
[foL 9] 6. Defendant repeats paragraph "3" hereof and
further denies each and every allegation contained in paragraphs "8", "9" and "10" of the complaint.
Fourth Defense:
7. Defendant repeats the admission, qualifications and
denials set forth hereinabove in paragraphs" 3", "4", "5"
and" 6" hereof.
8. Defendant further alleges:
a. The handbills (Plaintiff's Exhibit A attached to the
complaint) and sandwich men placards mentioned in the
complaint constitute commercial advertising matter.
b. The plaintiff caused said handbills and placards to be
distributed and exhibited for commercial advertising purposes with the sole' or at least primary intention and motive
of calling public attention to the place and subject matter
of his business, so as to increase his personal pecuniary
profits therefrom.
Wherefore, defendant prays this Honorable Court for
judgment dismissing the complaint herein with costs against
the plaintiff, and for such other and further relief as may
be deemed just and equitable in the premises.
.
William C. Chanler, Corporation Counsel, by William B. Trafford, Assistant Corporation Counsel,
Attorney for Defendant, Office and Post Office Address, Municipal Building, Borough of Manhattan,
City of N ew York.
\
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[fo1. 10]

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Findings of Fact and ConclusionS! of Law
FlhTDINGS OF F .ACT:

(1) The amount in controversy exceeds $3,000.
(2) The facts are further found as stipulated by the
parties.

LAw:
(1) The freedom of speech and of the preHS secured by
the First Amendment of the United States COllHtitutiol1
against abridgment by the United States is similarly secured
to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a state.
(2) The freedom of the press secured by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments confers upon the plaintiff a civil
right, subject only to reasonable regulation, to print and
distribute handbills such as Plaintiff's Exhibit A 01' to prepare and display" sandwich men" placards containing commercial 01' business advertising matter informing the public
as to the location of his exhibit and soliciting their patronage.
(3) This Court has jurisdiction over the Hubject matter
of the controversy herein by virtue of Sections 24 (1) and
24 (14) of the Judicial Code.
(4) New York Health Department Regulations, Article
ill, Section 318 (Sanitary Code, Section 318) in absolutely
prohibiting, as disintinguished from l'eaHonably regulating
the distribution of handbills such as Plaintiff's Exhibit A
containing commercial or business advertising' matter if-;
invalid and unconstitutional in that it abridges the freedom
of the press secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
,
[fo1.11] (5) New York Health Department Regulations,
Article III, Section 318 (Sanitary Code, Section 318) in
prohibiting the distribution of handbills such as Plaintiff's
Exhibit A containing commercial or bu~ine8s advertising'
matter but permitting the distribution of all other types of
handbills is discriminatory against tbe business man and
constitutes a deprivation of property without due process.
(6) Defendant may be permanently enjoined from enforcing New York Health Department Regulatiom" Article
CONCLUSIONS OF

9
III, Section 318 (Sanitary Code, Section 318) against the
plaintiff so as to prohibit the distribution by plaintiff or
his agents, of handbills such as Exhibit A containing business or commercial advertising.
(7) New York Park Department Regulations, Article II,
Section 6 is valid and, because in forbidding upon property
under the jurisdiction of the Park Department of the City
of N ew York the distribution of handbills such as Exhibit A
and the display of sandwichman placards containing business or commercial advertising, it does not abridge the freedom of the press secured by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
(8) Defendant may not be permanently enjoined from
enforcing New York Park Department Regulatiolls, Article
II, Section 6, so as to prohibit within areas under the jurisdiction vested in the Commissioner of Parks by the New
York City Charter, on the part of plaintiff or his agents,
(a) the distribution of commercial or business advertising
handbills [such as Plaintiff's Exhibit A] and (b) the display of "sandwichman" placards containing commercial or
business advertising matter.
New York, December 13, 1940.
Hulbert, U. S. D. J.
[fol. 12]

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Civil Action File No. 9

•

498
•

FIN AL DECREE

Final Decree Granting Permanent Injunction
This cause having come on for trial on November 4, 1940,
and the parties thereto having appeared by their respective
attorneys, and the cause having been submitted to this
Court on the agreed statement of facts of the parties for
trial without a jury, and this Court, upon readi:ng and filing
the complaint and answer thereto, after hearing all the evidence adduced, and being fully advised in the premises
having rendered its decision orally on November 4, 1940,
and having filed findings of fact and conclusion of law appropriate thereto, it is
Ordered, adjudged and decreed that Section 318 of the
Sanitary Code of the City of New York (Health Department Reg'ulations, Article III, Section 318), insofar as it

10
prohibits the distribution of handbills containing commercial or business advertising matter upon tmch t';treetH, Hidewalks and public places of New York City as are not within
the areas under the jurisdiction conferred upon the UOJl1missioner of Parks by the New York City Chm·ter, is Ullconstitutional and invalid as applied to the distribution by
plaintiff or his agents upon said streets, sidewalk::; and public places of handbills, such as Plaintiff's Exhibit A in this
cause, and the defendant and member::; of the Police Department are hereby perpetually enjoined from interfering with
said distribution of handbill:-; such as Plaintiff's Exhibit A,
by the plaintiff or his agents upon said ::;h'eets, sidewalks
and public places subject to the limitation hereinafter made
with respect to public parks, and it is further
Ordered, adjudged and decreed that N ew York City Park
Department Regulations, Article il, Section 6, insofar as it
[fol. 13] prohibits the distribution of handbills and the display of placards for advertising purposes, within Ruch areaR
as are under the jurisdiction conferred upon the Commissioner of Parks by the New York City Chartel', h~ (>om;titutional and valid, and the defendant and member::; of the
Police Department may lawfully prevent such distribution
(including the distribution of handbills such as Plaintiff's
Exhibit A) within said areas and said display within said
areas.
Enter.
Hulbert, U. S. D, J.
December 13, 1940.
-

[fo1. 14] IN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

E. 9 . · 198

Proceedings in Open Oourt
Before Hon. Murray Hulbert, District Judge
N ew York, November 4, 1940; 10 :30 A. M.
APPEARANCES:

Winthrop, Stjmson, Putnam & Roberts, Esqrs., Attorneys
for Plaintiff; WaIter W. Land, Esq., of Counsel.
William C. Chanler, Esq" Corporation Counsel, Attorney
for Defendant; W. B. Traifo"d, Esq., of Counsel.
Mr. Land: If your Honor please, this is a case in which
the plaintiff is seeking an llljunction against the City of
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New York to prevent the enforcement of two City ordinances, one, the Park ordinance, and the other, Section 318
of the Sanitary Code. If your Honor recalls, a temporary
order has been signed granting the plaintiff a temporary
injunction, and we are now applying for a permanent iujunction to complete the case. There is no 9.ispute as to the
facts and counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant have compiled an agreed statement of facts which
we wish to submit at this time. We also have a marked
copy of the bill of complaint in case your Honor wishes that
(handing papers to the Court).
[fo1.15] Mr. Trafford: Just a moment. We are agreeing
to those facts, your Honor, with the proviso that you have
signed the pendente lite decree which was submitted to your
Honor last week. I have not yet seen the decree and I don't
know, really, in what position the case is now.
The Court: I thought I signed it. I remember signing
the order.
Mr. Trafford: Well then, that is quite all right, then, and
we will-The Court: The papers may be in the clerk's office.
Mr. Land: I was just down there and they said the papers
had been sent to you on October 3l.
The Court : Well, they have. Now let us see what is here.
Mr. Land: There should be the findings of fact.
The Court: The findings of fact are here, and the temporary injunction and the order.
Mr. Land: That is correct.
Mr. Trafford: May I examine them just briefly, because
I hate to proceed without an examination.
The Court: Surely. Here they are. There will be no
decree until the case is finally disposed of. These are the
findings of fact as they were signed by me. I think the other
is a proposed finding. What is this other paper?
Mr. Land: That is the agreed statement of facts submitted
this morning. That is for the final decree. Would you like
a marked bill of complaint? ,Ve have brought one.
The Court: No, I do not need it. I have marked my own.
Mr. Land: Are there any motions that you want either
party to make here? We don't wish to take up your time
unduly.
The Court: I am not going to indicate to you what I think
you should do in the presentation of your case. If you have
an agreed statement of facts and that is satisfactory to both

•
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sides, I would naturally assume that there were no motions
to be made.
Mr. Land: All right.
[fo1. 16] The Court: Except that the defendant might feel
disposed to make a motion for a decree in his favor, upon
the theory that even assuming the agreed statement of facts
were true that there is no just cause for the relief which the
plaintiff seeks.
Mr. Trafford: That is precisely what I mean to do.
The Court: Well, let us proceed in order then. Counsel
for the plaintiff offers in evidence an agreed statemeJlt of
facts dated November 4, 1940, and signed by the attorneys
for the respective parties in this action.
I might call your attention to the fact that the stipulation, in order to comply with the rules, should bear the signature of the member of the firm.
Mr. Trafford: Well, let us do that.
(Agreed statement of fact signed by counsel for the respective parties and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No.1.)
Mr. Land: Plaintiff rests.
:MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Mr. Trafford: At thig point the defendant moves to digmiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a
cause of action, and moves to dismiss the plaintiff'l'l case 011
the ground that the evidence ~mbmitted does not contain
facts sufficient to constitute a cam.:;e of action in order to
entitle the plaintiff to legal or equitable relief.
The Court: In what respect?
Mr. Trafford: In respect that Section 318 of the Sanitary
Code and Section 6 of the Park RegulatiOlls are both valid
exercise of municipal police power and do not abridge the
freedom of the press secured by the 1st and 14th amendmentto the Oonstitution of the United States.
The Oourt: So far as. Section 318 and Article 6 are concerned, I will apply the same determination of law now that
I did upon the motion for a pl'elimi11ary injunction.
Mr. Trafford : Would you like us to submit, in accordance
with that ruling, findings of fact and conclusions of law 1
The Court: Well, your findings of fact and conclusions of
law are here.
•
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[foL 17] Mr. Trafford: Yes.
The Oourt: What I want to know is, outside of the
ruling I am making with respect to the constitutionality of
318 and the fact that I do not regard Article 6 as violated
here, whether there is any other point upon which you desire
to make a further motion for a dismissaL In other words,
I want to know in what respect you claim either that the
plaintiff has failed to make out a case on the agreed statement of facts or upon the agreed statement of facts the
Oourt is without jurisdiction to give the relief prayed for.
Mr. Trafford: Well, I would like to make a motion on
the further ground that ·can I make a motion in the alternative~ I should like to make it alternative. Upon reflection, I do not think it is necessary, but I would like to make
the final motion that the defendant moves to dismiss the
plaintiff's entire case on the ground that the Oourt is without jurisdiction under Section 24, subsection 14 of the Judicial Oode.
The Oourt: In what respect?
Mr. Trafford: Because, without duplication, this Court
has jurisdiction if there have been deprivation of a civil
right, and it is one of those bootstrap lifting things, so I
have to put that in. I mean if the ordinance is invalid,
then you have jurisdiction, and vice versa.
The Court: I think under the agreed statement of facts
plaintiff has been deprived of a substantial right .
Mr. Trafford: The defendant also moves to dismiss the
plaintiff's case on the ground that there has been no deprivation of property without due process of law, as contemplated under the 14th amendment of the United States Oonstitution.
The Oourt: Well now, do you mean by that that there
is a failure of proof in this case that anyone who might have
gone to the Battery, for example, if this submarine had been
moored there, did not go down to Pier 6 because the plaintiff was restrained from circulating or distributing these
handbills and therefore he did not get notice of it, but the
plaintiff has failed to produce on the witness stand here
[fo1. 18] some person to show that by reason of the restraint
which was exercised by the Police Oommissioner it lost
a customer?
Mr. Trafford: No, your Honor, that is not the purpose
of that motion. It was merely this. As you understand,
there are two aspects to this handbill legislation; one,
•
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whether it interferes with the freedom of the pre:::K, and
two, whether it is in any way an unrea~:;onable deprivation
of property. The last motion is to take care of that.
The Court: I understand your attitude to be a8 it was
on the motion for a preliminary injunction, that where a
handbill contains commercial advertising- and violates the
statute, and where it contains any matter that is of an educational character designed to promote anything of that sort
it is not violative of the statute, and if the printed matter
which you say constitutes commercial advertising were not
on there, then there would be 110 objection to that handbill.
Mr. Trafford! None whatsoever. It i:; just like theRe
election handbills you see all around.
The Court: I adhere to my previous determination that,
as I read the law now, that it has been extensively interpreted by the decisions of the United State:; Supreme Court,
and there is no distinction between one kind of advertisinp;
and the other.
Mr. Trafford: That is: between commercial and noncommercial advertising?
The Court: Yes, except that they do that in accordance
with the limitations that have been indieatecl bv• decisions
and which have been followed by the City of Philadelphia
in the case that I cited in my memorandum. The City
cannot be restrained from a reasonable exercise and control
over its streets, but neither can it, by a broad ordinance,
exclude all forms of circularizing by handbill under all circumstances. Well, the motions are denied.
Mr. Trafford: I will have to make one further motion.
The Oourt: All right.
Mr. Trafford: That is that Section 318 of the Sanitarv•
[fo1. 19] Code and Section 6 of the Park RegulationI' may
constitutionally be applied to the particular double-face
handbill which is the subject matter of this litigation and
therefore plaintiff's case should be dismissed.

The Court: I am going to hold it as I did on the motion
for a preliminary injunction that so far aB the diBtribution
of handbills in the park, that cannot be done, and that so
far as the use of sandwich-men signs, so-called, l1eitber may
that be done in the park or upon the streets adjacent to
and which are within the jurisdiction of the Park Commissioner, but that so far as the streets and avenues are concerned, under the broad language of Section 318, its application upon the facts as set forth in the agreed statement
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in this case is, in my opinion, invalid and unenforceable)
and a decree may be entered accordingly.
Mr. Land: You will not wish to have conclusions of law
re-submitted then for the final decree; we will just submit
the decree for signature?
The Court : Your findings and conclusions are all in here,
I take it.
Mr. Land: The agreed statement of facts that we handed
up this morning does not go into the law, your Honor.
There hav~ been, of course, conclusions of law submitted
previously in connection with the temporary injunction.
The Court : No, you will have to have conclusions made
in your order the foregoing findings and conclusions and
you specify or distinguish between the findings of fact and
conclusions of law. All you need is a decree to carry into
effect the findings of fact and conclusions of law as agreed
upon by yourselves.
Mr. Trafford: If your Honor please, to correct the record, we agree only to the form and not the substance of
those conclusions of law.
The Court : Well, I am finding them as to the facts and
I am also making the conclusion that you have agreed upon
as to form.
Mr. Trafford: All right.
,

[fol. 20]
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK
F. J. CHRESTENSEN, PlOJintijf,
against
LEWIS J. VALENTINE, Individually and as Police Commissioner of New York City, Defendant
AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS
Whereas this Court, upon plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction in the above entitled action, has rendered
its decision dated August 26, 1940, made findings of fact

16
and conclusions of law, and entered an order thereon granting plaintiff's motion in part and denying it in part; and
"\Vhel'eas there is no dhqmte between the parties UH to
the facts of the case.
Now, Therefore, the undersigned, attorneys for the rt'spective parties, hereby agree to the following statement
of facts:

1. Plaintiff, a citizen of Florida, owns and maintains
for the purposes of exhibition to the public at a Jix('c1 ac1m1Hsion fee the former U. S. Na\'V
submarine
"S,49."
•
2. Defendant, a citizen of New York, iH the duly appointed and acting Police Commissioner of New York City.
[fol. 21J 3. New York City Health Department Regulations, Article ill, Sec. 318 (Sanitary Code, Sec. 31S), he1't'1nafter caned the health regulation, provideH at-l follows:
"Handbills, cards and circulars. No person shall throw,
cast or distribute, or cause or permit to bt' thrown, cat-lt
or distributed, any handbill, circular, carel, booklet, placard
or other advertising matter whatHo('"'\'er in or upon any
street or public place, or in a front yard or court yard, or on
any stoop, or in the vestibule or any hall of any building,
or in a letter box therein; provided, that nothing herein
contained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise regulate the delivery of any such matter by the United States
. postal service, or prohibit the distribution of sample copies
of newspapers regularly sold by the copy or by annual
subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the
lawful distribution of anything other than commercial and
business advertising matter."
4. New York City Park Departmeut RegulationR, Article II, Sec. 6, hereinafter called the park regulation, provides as follows:
"Advertising and littering' prohibited.- No perRon Rhall
post any bill, placard, notice or other paper upon any
structure, tree, rock, article or thing' within any park, or
upon any park street, or paint or affix therein, in any other
way, any advertisement, notice or exhortation. No p<'>l't-lon
shall distribute, hand out, deliver, place, caRt about or lea"e
about any bill, billboard, ticket, handbill, carel, placard,
circular, pamphlet or display any flag-, banner, transpareucy,
target, sign, placard or any matter for advertising pur-
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poses, or operate any musical instrument or drum within
a:ny park or upon any park stl'eet, or cause any noises to be
made for advertising purposes or for the purpose of at[fol. 22] trading attention to any exhibition, performance,
show or other purpose, within any park or upon any park
street. The placing, or using for any other purpose than
reading of newspapers, or other papers on the beaches
or boardwalks, on the lawns or beaches of public parks,
is prohibited,"
5. Defendant, or his agents, by threatening to enforce
the health regulation against plaintiff, has restrained plaintiff from distributing in the streets and other public places
of the City of New York, copies of a certain handbill, hereinafter called handbill A, a copy of which is attached to the
Bill of Complaint and marked "Plaintiff's Exhibit A," and
a copy of which is also attached hereto and likewise marked
"Plaintiff's Exhibit A," and by this reference made a part
hereof.
6. Handbill A bears on the face thereof commercial or
business advertising matteI' informing the public of the location of plaintiff's exhibit and soliciting their patronage.
7. The reverse side of handbill A contains, not commercial or business advertising matter, but rather a public protest against the conduct of the New York City Department
of Docks in denying plaintiff wharfage facilities at piers
owned by New York City and situated at the Battery.
8. Plaintiff had earlier, on or about .June 29, 1940, prepared a handbill, hereinaftel' called handbill No.1, a copy
of which is attached hereto and marked "Defendant's Exhibit 1" and by this reference made a part hereof. The defendant, or his agents, informed the plaintiff that the distribution of handbill No.1 would be a violation of the park
and health regulations but that plaintiff could distribute
handbills which contained only information or a public protest. Plaintiff thereupon revised handbill No.1 by removing
from the face of it certain advertising matter and by printing on the reverse side of the handbill a public protest,
[fol. 23] which revised handbill is handbill A. On being
shown a printer's proof of handbill A, defendant, or his
agents, advised plaintiff that the protest matter on the reverse side thereof could be distributed without police restraint, if separated from the commercial advertising matter
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remaining on the face thereof. Plaintiff caused handbill A
to be printed with the said protest matter appearing on
the reverse side thereof, and has not attempted to distribute
said protest matter disassociated from said commercial advertising matter. Defendant, or his agents, restrained the
plaintiff from distributing handbill A, as described in pal'ag'raphs 5 and 9 hereof, and plaintiff thereupon brought this
action.
9. Defendant by threatening to enforce the park rep:ulation against plaintiff has restrained plaintiff from displaying "sandwichman" placards and from distributinp: copies
of handbill A upon streets and sidewalks adjacent and contiguous to the central area of Battery Park, but within the
jurisdiction of the Commjssioner of Parks and possibly
within the borders of the various tracts of land dedicated
for park purposes in the Battery Park area.
10. The restraints described in paragraphs 5 and 9 hereof
have resulted, and their continuance will result, in a diminution of the number of persons paying fees for admission
to plaintiff's submarine. The net profits which plaintiff
would realize in the absence of said restraints exceed the
sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000).
Dated, November 4, 1940.
Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, Attorneys
for Plaintiff, By Walter W. Land. William C.
Chanler, Corporation Counsel, AttornE'y for Defendant, by William B. Trafford.

(Here follow 3 photolithographs, side folios 24-26)
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It is almod unbelievable that a _t;ity governed by a mayor who is one cf the outstanding liberal$
of the United States, a man noted for his square dealing and belief in impartiality in the affain of
•
g.overnment, should have a subordinate who acts in a dictatorial manner and draws a distinction
as to what ships will be allowed to dock in the City of New York at piers whiclr are under his control.

.

The Submarine S·49 has been .e~hibited at municipal piers in Baltimore, Philadelphia, Newark,
Chicago, Cleveland, Buffalo and many others. Every municipal dock department that I have come
in contact with was not only willing, but anxious, to assist me in securing the best availllble docking
facilities for the convenience of the people of their city who wished to visit this subm<'lrine. To find a
dock commissioner who apsolutery refused me docking space ot city owned piers such as tho Battery
Park and the adjoir!ng Pier I A, not only in the summer but in November as well, when there were no
boats using any of these.loca.fio~ anclat a time when it would have moant a substantial revenue to
fhe city, seems unbelieveable.
The reason given me by the Commissioner'$ secretary was that they had refusod permi:~i.
for other boats to tie up at city owned docn for the purpose of operating as night dub~,
'resta~rantS' and dance hailS'. This comparison is, of course, ridiculous, as this type of businoss could be
established just 0$· well in any of the hundreds of idle buildings throughout the city. In the elise of this
submarihe, it is entirely different as this is the exh ibition of a ship which cannot bo shown oxcept dt
II doc~, as this is the only submarine used for exhibition purposes in the entire world.
There is no
other opportunity
for
the
people
to
see
one.
Especially
at
this
time,
it
is
of
on
intense
int~rest
to
the
,
general public because of the. biJr\Dns of doUaI$. which they are willingly paying in tIlXO' to build
up the greatest navy in the world, they are: mote: deeply interested in seeing the way those ships
ere constructed. Dock Commi$$loner- McKemie- ha£ deprived- the- people of Now York City of the
opportunity d£ seeing. this submarine as far as' he has been abrA, and it is my opinion that he
haS' acted contrary to the personal interest of the people and the finencilll interest of the city. If
these docks were Mr. McKenzie's personel property, he would have tha right to refuse to accept
rental for them. But as an agent for the ciiy, iheems strange that he should refuse the income
of several hundred dollars a month for docks that were idle.
It is only because of the fact thot the State of New York is allowing me the use of Pier 5
fhe East River th<'lt the people of New York are now able to see this submarine, While not as
convient for the visitors as Battery Pork, by following the diagram on the other side of this paper,
it may be reached in about two (2) minutes.
CAPT. F. J. CHRESTENSEN,
Exhibitor of the former
U. S. Navy Submorine S·~9
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[foL 27]

IN UNITED STATES DISTRIOT COURT
NOTICE OF ApPEAL

SIRS:

Please take notice that the defendant hereby appeals
to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, from so much of the final decree, entered herein in the
office of the Clerk of the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, on or about the 14th day of
December, 1940, as provides as follows:
"it is
Ordered, adjudged and decreed that section 318 of the
Sanitary Code of the City of New York (Health Department Regulations, Article III, section 318), in so far as it
prohibits the distribution of handbills containing commercial or business advertising matter upon such streets, sidewalks and public places of New York City as are not
within the areas under the jurisdiction conferred upon the
Commissioner of Park by the New York Oity Charter, is
unconstitutional and invalid as applied to the distribution
by plaintiff or his agents upon said streets, sidewalks and
public places of handbills, such as Plaintiff's Exihibit A in
this cause, and the defendant and members of the Police
Department are hereby perpetually enjoined from interfering with said distribution of handbills such as Plaintiff's
Exhibit A, by the plaintiff or his agents upon said streets,
sidewalks and public places subject to the limitation here[foL 28] inafter made with respect to public parks."
Dated, March 8, 1941.
Yours, etc., William C. Ohanler, Oorporation Counsel, Attorney for Defendant, Office & P. O. Address,
Municipal Building, Borough of Manhattan, New
York Oity.
To: Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, Esqs., Attorneys for Plaintiff, 32 Liberty Street, New York City.
- - - - , Clerk of the United States District Oourt,
Southern District of New York.
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[fol. 29]

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT OOURT
STIPULATION SETTLING CASE

It is hereby stipulated and agreed that the foreg'oing i:-<
a true transcript of the record of the said District Court in
the above entitled action and that the Clerk may :-;0 certify.
Dated, N ew York, May 16th, 1941.
Winthrop, Stjmson, Putnam & Roberts, Attorneys
for Plaintiff. William C. Chanler, Corporation
Counsel, Attorney for Defendant.

Clerk's Certificate to foregoing
printing.

•

tram~cript

omitted in

30
[fo1. 30] UNITED STATES OIRCUIT OOURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT, OCTOBER TERM, 1940
Argued June 13, 1941.

Decided July 25, 1941

No. 358

F. J. CHRESTENSEN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
LEWIS J. VAIiENTINE, individually and as Police Oommissioner of New York Oity, Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the District Oourt of the United States for
the Southern District of N ew York
Action by F. J. Ohrestensen against Lewis J. Valentine,
individually and as police commissioner of New York Oity,
to enjoin enforcement against plaintiff of New York City
Sanitary Oode, §318, prohibiting the distribution of handbills. From a final decree perpetually enjoining enforcement of the regulation as against plaintiff, defendant appeals.
'
See, also, D. O. S. D. N. Y., 34 F. Supp. 596.
Affirmed.
•
Before: Swan, Clark and Frank, Oircuit Judges.
[fo1. 31] Walter W. Land, of New York City (Winthrop,
Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, of New York Oity, on the
brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
William S. Gaud, Jr., Asst. Oorp. Counsel, of New York
City (William O. Ohanler, Corp. Oounsel, and Paxton Blair
and William B. Trafford, Asst. Oorp. Oounsel, all of New
York Oity, on the brief), for defendant-appellant.
Olark, Oircuit Judge:
This case presents another aspect of the much litigated
question as to the validity of municipal prohibitions against
the distribution of handbills in streets and public places.
Lovell v. Oity of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ot. 666, 82
L. Ed. 949; Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308
U. S. 147, 60 S. Ot. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155; Hague v. C. 1. 0.,
•
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307 U. S. 496, 518, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423. The prohibition here involved is found in New York City Sanitary
Code, §318 (Health Department Regulations, Art. ill, ~318),
but with a saving sentence limiting its application to "commercial and business advertising matter." Upon tbis limitation the defendant city police commissioner rests his case
herein, since he regards plaintiff's handbills as commercial
advertising. But on application for an injunction pendente
lite, the district court held the regulation -entirely invalid
in an opinjon reported in 34 F. Supp. 596, though not of
record here, notwithstanding Federal Rule 75(g). And after
a hearing on the merits wherein the facts were stipulated,
the court entered its decree perpetually enjoining defendant
from emorcing the regulation as against distribution of
plaintiff's handbills. This appeal followed. .A further C011[fol. 32] tention involving a city park regulation was decided adversely to plaintiff and is not the subject of appeal.
Plaintiff, a citizen of Florida, is the owner of the former
U. S. Navy Submarine S-49, "a $2,000,000 fighting monster, " as his handbill asserts. He has exhibited this submarine in various cities, and in 1940 applied to the City for
permission to dock at city-owned docks off Battery Parle
This was refused, apparently because permission had been
denied other boats to operate as night clubs, restaurants,
and dance halls. Plaintiff then secur-ed permission to dock
at a state-owned pier in the East River and thereupon prepared handbills to advertise the submarine as docked at
Pier 5, East River, two minutes away from Batt-ery Park.
This draft of handbill was a direct bid for pa tronag·c. It
{lontained a cut of the submarine, a statement that competent guides would take a person from one end of it to the
other, insistent directions to see several featured pointsthe torpedo compartment, the sleeping quarters, the kitchen,
and fually "See how men live in a Hell Diver" and a
schedule of "popular prices" (adults 251 and children 15¢).
Defendant or hi~ agents having informed plaintiff that distribution of this handbill would be illegal, but that bills containjng only information or a public protest could be distributed, plaintiff revised his material to the form which is
the subject matter of this suit.
In its fual form mucl1 of the material of the first handbill was preserved; included was the cut of the submarine

-
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and the map showing the approach to Pier 5 in the East
River opposite Battery Park; but elided were all.ref.erences
to the sale of tickets or the price thereof. In place of the
schedule of prices appeared the statement, "The only submarine used for exhibition in the world"; instead of the
insistent commands to "see" the described points of in terest were only the drab statements that" Submarine S-49
contains" the torpedo compartment, the sleeping quarters,
[fo1. 33] the kitchen, etc.; and the invitation to see life in a
hell diver vanished entirely. On the reverse side of this
bill appeared four paragraphs of rather closely spaced
type, over plaintiff's name as "Exhibitor of the former
U. S. Navy Submarine S-49" and under the title, "Submarine Refused Permission To Dock At Any Oity Owned
Pier By Oommissioner of Docks McKenzie." Herein appeared a spirited protest against the' , almost unbelievable"
action of "dictatorial" subordinates of "a mayor who is
one of the outstanding liberals of the United States" in
refusing plaintiff permission to tie up to city-owned piers,
contrary to his treatment in many other named cities. The
protest concluded with the statement that it was only because the State of New York allowed plaintiff the use of
Pier 5 in the East River that the people of New York were
now able to see this submarine. "While not as convenient
for the visitors as Battery Park, by following the diagram
on the other side of this paper, it may be reached in about
two (2) minutes."
Defendant's agents, being shown a printer's proof of this
handbill, still asserted its illegality, but told plaintiff that
the protest appearing on its reverse side could be distributed without police restraint if separated from" the commercial advertising matter" remaining on the face. Plaintiff nevertheless caused the handbill to be printed, defendant
restrained its distribution, and plaintiff brought this action
for an injunction. Jurisdiction rests upon diversity of
citizenship of the parties, there being more than $3,000 involved, and also upon the deprivation of a constitutional
right. 28 U. S. O. A. §41 (1) and (14); Hague v. O. I. 0.,
supra.
Defendant's claim is that the face of the handbill constituted commercial or business advertising matter within
the interdiction of the city ordinance or regulation. This
enactment in some analogous form goes back for many
years. In 1938, it was transmuted into the present health
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[fol. 34] department regulation, and the important second
or final sentence was added to make the entire provision
read as follows:
.

"Handbills, cards antI ci't"C'Zitla'ts. No perf'i.on shall throw,
cast or distribute, or cause or permit to be thrown, cast or
distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard
or other advertising matter whatsoever, in 01' upon any
street or public place, or in a front yard or court yard, or
on any stoop, or in the vestibule or any hall of any building,
or in a letter box therein; provided, that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise regulate the
delivery of any such. matter by the United State!:'! po~tal
service, or prohibit the distribution of sample copies of
newspapers regularly sold by the copy or by annual subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the lawful distribution of anything other than commercial and
business advertising matter."
Without the last sentence, either expressed 01' implied,
it seems quite clear that the regulation is invalid under the
Supreme Court cases cited, as abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press secured against state invasion by
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Since the
claimed purpose of the regulation is to protect public health
by preventing the littering of streets, it might be doubted
whether the regulation thus truncated accomplishes enough
to be worth savjng. The city officials, however, support the
regulation as limited, on the ground that partial prevention
of street littering is better than none at alP Moreover,
[fol.35] they view the 1938 limitation as merely embodying previous state judicial rulings and as brlllging about a
discriminating type of handbill regulation which iH wit11in
the Suprem-e Court precedents.
1

It is suggested- rather blithely, we think that com-

mercial handbills will cause more street litter than 11011commercial, as more quickly discarded- -thus assuming- that
the public is more interested in political and religious discussion than in commercial bargains or amusement notices.
Of., however, Milwaukee v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383, 383, 234
N. W. 352; People v. Young, 33 Cal. ApI). 2d 747, 85 P.
2d 231; 39 Mich. L. Rev. 561, 589; but see Cou?;hlin v.
Sullivan, 100 N. J. L. 42, 126 A. 177.
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So far as State judicial history is concerned, there is
authority for their position, although, as we view it, rather
less persuasive or compelling than their argument presupposes. The prohibition seems to have been pretty thoroughly upheld in the early case of People v. Horwitz, 27
N. Y. Cr. R. 237, 140 N. Y. S. 437, 1912, although in People
v. Lookstein, 78 Misc. 306, 139 N. Y. S. 680, a conviction of
the person furnishing the circulars as an abettor was reversed. In 1921, however, in p.eople v. Johnson, 117 Misc.
133, 191 N. Y. S. 750, the court upheld the ordinance only
by restricting it to commercial advertising and actually dismissed the complaint against the then defendant. Thereafter, until the recent case of People v. La Rollo, 24 N. Y.
S. 2d 350, this regulation and similar city ordinances seem
regularly to have been set aside, at least as to the persons
actually before the court, with or without suggestion of the
distinction made in the Johnson case. See Estey v. Coleman, 174 Misc. 780, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 829; City of Rochester v.
Parr, 165 Misc. 182, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 771; People ex reI. Gordon v. McDermott, 169 Misc. 743, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 795·; People
v. Ribinovich, 171 Misc. 569, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 135; People v.
2
De Julis, 174 Misc. 836, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 995. A regulation
requiring a license to sell merchandis-e was held invalid as
applied to pamphlets in People v. Banks, 168 Misc. 515, 6 N.
Y. S. 2d 41, not applicable to pamphlets in People v. Finkel[fo1. 36] stein, 170 Misc. 188, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 941, and valid
as to song sheets, which were "ess-entially commercial"
publications, in People v. Samuels, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 113. In
Walters v. Valentine, 172 Misc. 274, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 612,
Justice McCook held invalid a regulation prohibiting advertising by sandwich men, but excepting pickets, ev·en against
the City's suggested distinction between commercial and
noncommercial advertising.
There seem also to have been several unreported decisions of like tenor. People ex reI. Horan v. H~rry Goren,
Mag. Ct., N. Y. C., 1935, 4 I. J. A. Bull., No.3, p. 3; City of
New Rochelle v. McCormick, City Ct., New Rochelle, 1935,
4 Westchester L. J. 99; People v. Lorenz & Ross, Mag. Ct.,
N. Y. C., 1933, 1 I. J. A. Bull., No. 12, p. 2. See, also, 3
ibid. No.3, pp. 1, 2, No.6, p. 3, No. 11, p. 2, No. 12, p. 2; 4
ibid. No.3, p. 2; 5 ibid. 147-151 ; 6 ibid. 103 ; People v. Black,
135 Misc. 841, 241 N. Y. S. 756; People v. Holo-stein, 150
Misc. 101, 268 N. Y. S. 50.
2
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Finally, after the decision below, ca.me People v. La Rollo,
supra, where the city magistrate did accept the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial advertising as
ground for upholding the present form of § 318. The court
took pains, however, to distinguish our case here as on the
border line between commercial advertising and protest,
and hence not applicable to the case then before it.
With such a record of uncertainty as to the validity and
effect of the regulation, with the further necessity adverted to below· . ,.. of making refined distinctions between
circulars "primarily" commercial or otherwise and enterprises entered into "primarily" for commercial purposes
to sustain the regulation and make it workable, the able
Corporation Counsel and his skilled staff might well have
paused before attempting to sustain only the remnant!:' of
the original prohibitory scheme; or might well have preferred to try their hand at the devising of an ordinance
"narrowly drawn" (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296,
307, 311, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213) to secure at once
the legitimate objectives of the City without the chance
of infringing on the cherished constitutional rights of the
individual. That the city officers chose nevertheless to
apply the regUlation as against the plaintiff is due, we think
to a failure to accord due force to all the several rulings
in Schneider v. State, supra.
After the decision in Lovell v. City of Griffin, supra, four
state courts of high authority proeeeded to uphold ol'clinances involving handbills on various gronnd~, in earb case
[fol. 37] c1istinp,'uishing Lovell v. City of Griffin. Three of
these decisions involved prohibition against the distribution of handbills; while one concerned the regulation of
canvassing and soliciting'. This difference in the cases is
important to an understanding of Schneider v. State, supra,
which reversed all four cases. Of tll(~ three handbill cases,
the most importa:nt here is the reversal of People Y. Young,
supra, for involved in that case was a ]landbill giving a
notice of a meeting under the auspices of "Friends Lincoln
Brigade," at which speakers were to discuss the war in
Spain. On the handbill were the words ".A.dmi[o;sion 25¢
and 50¢." The state court said of this, as quoted by the
Supreme Court, 308 U. S. at page 165, n. 3: "WhateYel'
traffic in ideas the Friends Lincoln Brigade may have
planned for the meeting, the cards themselves seem to fall
within the classification of commercial advertising rather
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than the expression of one's views. But if this be so, our
conclusion is not thereby changed." When, however, the
Supreme Oourt rendered its decision in the handbill cases,
it pointed out that none of them purported "to license distribution but all of them absolutely prohibit it in the streets
and, one of them, in oiher public places as well." 308 U. S.
at page 162. It was held that "the purpose to keep the
streets clean and of good appearance· is insufficient to justify
an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public
street from handing literature to one willing to receive it,"
that' I there are obvious methods of preventing littering,"
such as punishment of those who actually throw papers on
the street, and that all the ordinances were invalid. Hence
it seems clear that a handbill containing advertising matter,
even, a schedule of admission charges, is not in itself rendered outside the pale of protection against such an absolute
and complete prohibition.
The fourth case involved an ordinance of the Oity of
Irvington, New Jersey, carefully drawn to protect and li[foL 38] cense the privilege of canvassing and soliciting. It
was" not limited to those who canvass for private profit,"
but required generally a submission to the judgment of a
police officer as to granting of the permit, fingerprinting,
3
photographing, and so on. The court held .this ordinance
invalid as against the petitioner, a member of Jehovah's
Witnesses, who was distributing tracts. It went on to say,
308 U. S. at page 165: "We are not to be taken as holding
that commercial soliciting and canvassing may not be subjected to such regulation as the ordinance requires. Nor
do we hold that the town may not:fix reasonable hours when
canvassing may be done by persons having such objects as
the petitioner. Doubtless there are other features of such
activities which may be regulated in the public interest without prior licensing or other invasion of constitutional
liberty. "
Moreover, the Oourt now made express what previous decisions had implied, namely, that the explicit constitutional
protection accorded freedom of expression made support of
the legislative preference less imperative T but that, indeed,
"the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the
See, also, the opinions below, Town of Irvington v.
Schneider, 120 N. J. L. 460, 200 A. 799, affirmed 121 N. J. L.
542, 3 A. 2d 609.
3
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challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting' matters of public convenience may well
support regulation directed at other personal activities, but
be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions." 308 U. S. at page 161; see 40 Col. L. Rev. 531.
This admonition is repeated in almost identic- words in
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84
L. Ed. 1093, while the different rule applicable where more
jmportant sovereign rights are involved is contrasted in
the "flag salute" case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 595, 60 S. Ct. 1010, 84 L. Ed. 1375. In
[fo1. 39] the latter case the court, referring to the interest
there involved, national lmity, which was the basig of national security, said: "To deny the legislature the right
to select appropriate means for its attainment presents a
totally di fferent order of problem from that of the propriety of subordinating the possible ugliness of littered
streets to the free expression of opinion through distribution of handbills. Compare Schneider v. State, 308 U. S.
147." See, also, Cox v. New Hampshire, 61 S. C. 762.
We think, therefore, that interpretation of the conclusions
of the Schneider case is not doubtful. Absolute prohibition of expression "in the market place" is megal, not
to be saved by any commercial taint attached to tbe expression; reasonable regulation of soliciting, not prev('nting freedom of expression, is permissible.4 And in the
latte:r case, where the soliciting is for profit, gteps to id('ntify, even to license, the solicitor may be upheld to prevent
fraud upon or inconvenience to tbe public. (Note that tbis
distinction between forms of solicitation may be made clear,
definite, and workable, since it has a common-sense purpose
in mind and deals with reg'Ulation, not pl'obibition j Witll it
may be contrasted the distinctions hereinafter discussed.)
And borderline cases are to be resolved not in favor of the
regulation, but in favor of the cherished rigbt.
To avoid the conclusion to which this reasoning necessarily points, defendant suggests a different interpretation
of the governing' precedents, resting upon certain assumpOf. 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 866, 868 i 28 Geo. L. J. 649 j
53 Harv. L. Rev. 487; 8 I. J. A. Bull. 566, 567; 14 St. John's
L. Rev. 401. Other law review comments are noted in
note 5, below.
4
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tions and distinctions which he presses with vigor. First
to meet the issue that handbills containing at least some
advertising matter have been protected, he 'sug'gests that
the prohibit.ion does not apply unless the handbill is "primarily" commercial. On this ground he distinguishes
[fol. 40] People v. Taylor, 33 Cal. App. 2d 760, 85 P. 2d
978, for there the circular supported as against the San
Diego ordinance did contain advertising matter of subscriptions to, a daily paper, of books and pamphlets, and
of a book store but it was a "publication of a radical but
not incendiary nature, mainly devoted to political discussion but containing certain advertising matter," 33 Cal.
App. 2d at page 762. Again, it is suggested that a commercial advertisement is to be distinguished from a noncommercial advertisement or matter "exclusively or primarily calculated to attract the attention and patronage
of the public to a non-commercial enterprise, i.e., one entered into primarily for considerations other than pecuniary gain." On this basis the Los Angeles handbill considered in Schneider v. State, supra, is denominated noncommercial. And so also are distinguished other cases
holding broadly that such handbill ordinances are illegal.
People v. Armstrong', 73 Mich. 288, 41 N. W. 275, 2 L. R. A.
721, 16 Am. St. Rep. 578; City of Chicago v. Schultz, 341
Ill. 208, 173 N. E. 276. Still other precedents are distinguished as applying merely to ordinances entirely vague
or discriminatory against certain kinds of advertising only.
Cleveland Shopping News Co, v. City of Lorain, 37 Ohio
L. R. 527, 13 Ohio Abs. 265; In re Thornburg, 55 Ohio App.
229, 9 N. E. 2d 516; Ex parte Johns, 129 Tex. Cr. R. 487, .
88 S. W. 2d 709; Ex parte Pierce, 127 Tex. Cr. R. 35, 75
S. W. 2d 264. Thus a rather impressive array of judicial
precedents is put aside, once we accept the assumptions
urged upon us.
Perhaps we can pass the fact that the distinctions argued
for are not explicitly stated in either legislation 01' decision
(except perhaps in People v. La Rollo, supra), since the
necessity of drawing lines, of making narrow distinctions,
is so usual a part of interpretation and adjudication. But
we still have the question as to the reasonable and rational
consequences of the particular location of the line and how
[fo1. 41] well it effectuates the objectives to be subserved or
balances the opposing policies. And at once we are faced
2
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''lith the question, How much is "primarily"1 i ( P,·ima.rily
commercial" presumably signifies a test quantitative in
amount; a limited dross of commercialism does not vitiate,
though a more substantial amount may, and pre::mmably
will. In contrast, however, when we turn to the other assumed definition, we must presumably weigh motives or intent to determine the non-commercial nature of an enterprise "primarily for considerations other than pecuniary
gain. " In net result the police officers administerillp,' the
regUlation are to be arbiters just as they undertook to be
here of the quantum of advertising as against prote!:lt and
of the purpose of the citizen in speaking and writing. The
test seems to be therefore both objective and Rubjective,
though, as defendant concedes, the Supreme Court decisionR ,
above cited "have shifted the initial constitutional inquiry
from abstract' aim' to concrete operation." If the police
are to weigh purpose and intent, as well as the effeet of the
literary product, "concrete operation" here will pretty
surely result in prohibiting freedom of expression in ways
and to an extent quite unconnected with problem:; of city
sanitation.o
Plaintiff's handbill furnishes a good example of the uncertainty, not to speak of unreality, of the suggested diRtinctions. Sheer number of words favors the protest as
against all the rest of the handbill, whether it be conRidel'ed
[fo1. 42] advertising or mere factual information concerning the submarine. Spacing and display give at least equal
place to the protest. But if intent and purpose must be
Criticism of the suggested "commercial" distinction is
made in 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 675, 676; but in 35 Ill. L. Rev.
90, 94, the subjective nature of the test "ascertainiup; tbe
principal purpose intended by the distributor in each
case"-.. is thought capable of accomplishment IIwitbout
great difficulty." For comments discussing somewhat the
suggested distinction, see, also, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 570; 13 So.
Calif. L. Rev. 253; 25 Wash. U. L. Q. 611; Lindsay, Council
and Court; the Handbill Ordinances, 1889-1939, 39 Mich. L.
Rev. 561, 580, 589, 593. It seems not referred to in many
notes, 40 Col. L. Rev. 531; 1 Bill of Rights Rev. 53; ef. 15
Ind. L. J. 312; 6 Mo. L. Rev. 103, while still others point out
that the Schneider case appears to invalidate absolute })1'0hibition of even commercial circulars; see reviews cited,
note 4, above.
6
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measuredr how can we say that plaintiff's motives are only
or primarily financial ~ 6 Is he just engaged in an advertising plot, or does he really believe in his wrongs ~ We know
how opposition to oppression, real or fancied, grows upon a
person, and we can suspect that by now plaintiff regards
himself as a crusader against injustice. If so, he is in the
democratic tradition and within the protection of the Bill
of Rights, which safeguards the right of the individual even
more than that of the group or party. Indeed, we think it is
a misconception of the great freedom here involved to hold
it more applicable to group protest for abstract religious or
political principle than to individual protests for concrete
business injuries. Not such was the attitude of the founding fathers; was it not against a tax on tea that one of our
most cherished blows for freedom was struck~ Of course,
we recognize the need, as well as the common sense, of distinguishing between profit-making and nonprofit-making
activities for many relevant matters, as in use of the mails,
levy of customs duties, and other similar examples which
defendant cites to us. But we think it is quite a different
thing to say that expression in p.ublic places by handbill or
circular must be, not regulated, but forbidden to the business man who would make a protest against official mistreat[fol. 43] ment of himself in his business affairs. Not such,
as we understand it, is the interpretation of the constitu•

Some point is made of the stipulated fact that the handbill "bears' on the face thereof commercial or business advertising matter informing the public of the location of
plaintiff's exhibit and soliciting their patronage," as perhaps putting plaintiff out of court on his own admission.
This, however, does not purport to be a reflection of plaintiff's mind, but only an interpretation of the document,
which, being before us, we can read for ourselves. It illustrates the difficulties of characterization which refinements of definition compeL For the handbill informs the
public of the location of the exhibit, but nowhere directly
solicits patronage; that is the reader's deduction as to the
writer's intent. Should prohibition of expression rest upon
the drawing of such inferences ~ Note, further, that the protest itself, which the police officers were willing to accept,
tells of the location of the exhibit and indicates an expectation of "visitors."
G
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tional intent set forth in Schneider v. State, supra. And we
do not feel justified in impugning plaintiff's motive to sustain legislation with such evils inherent in it. Compare
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, 310 U. S. at page 97.
To avoid misunderstanding, perhaps we should say that,
while absolute prohibition of commercial handbills seems to
us of doubtful validity, yet we need decide no more here
than that at least it cannot extend to a combined protest and
advertisement not shown to be a mere subterfuge. And
without attempting to suggest the form which regulation
might take, though Schneider v. State, supra, appears to
point the way, we think it proper to say that even an absolute prohibition against casting matter into the streets is
seemingly valid (cf. City of Philadelphia v. Brabendel', 201
Pa. 574,51 A. 374, 58 L. R. A. 220 j Buxbom v. City of Riverside, D. C. S. D. Cal., 29 F. Supp. 3), and that regulation or
licensing of solicitation for business enterprises to prevent
imposition upon 01' inconvenience of the public is likewise
sustainable under the cited precedents.
Affirmed.
Frank, Circuit Judge, dissents with opinion.

FRANK, C. J., dissenting:
To my mind, the majority opinion has reached the wrong
conclusion primarily because it erroneously deals with this
case as if it involved the attempted distribution of a single
handbill of non~commercial or "free speech" character,
which contains some related and incidental commercial or
business advertising. On that fallacious assumption of fact,
[fol. 44) the majority holds that the City ordinance, here before us, is unconstitutional in so far as it prohibits the distribution on City streets of such a non-commercial handbill.
The opinion also expresses a doubt as to its constitutionality
even as to wholly commercial or business advertising circulars, but does not rest the decision on that ground. I shall
late~ discuss that doubt; but first I shall try to show the
error of the majority's factual premise, since, if that fails,
the principal ground of its decision vanishes:
Chrestensen had two separate and totally distinct disputes with City officials, the one having to do with the loca-
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tion of his submarine, and the other with the distribution
of his handbills: (a) The first dispute arose when he asked
permission to do his business that of publicly showing his
submarine for profit at a city-owned dock. When this request was refused by the Dock Commissioner, Chrestensen
became indignant, [This indignation soon became, as we
shall see, the subject of one of his handbills.] He was, however, able to arrange to display the submarine at a stateowned dOelL (b) The second dist~nct dispute arose when
he asked the police for permission to distribute on the City
streets a handbill, Exhibit 1, which Chrestensen and the
majority opinion concede to have been a frankly commercial
handbill 'soliciting visitors to see his submarine on a paid
admission basis. Because of the City ordinance here before
us, the Police Commissioner, through his subordinates,
denied this request.
Then Ohrestensen prepared two handbills which are the
subject of this litigation. They are not related, but he
caused the two to be printed on the front and back, respectively, of a single sheet of paper, Exhibit A:
(a) On the face of this sheet, is printed a revised edition
of Exhibit 1, his earlier commercial handbill; this revised
handbill is described in the stipulation of facts (executed
[fo1. 45] on Chrestensen's behalf and on the basis of which
this case is being' decided) as consisting of "commercial
and advertising matter informing the public of the location
of" the submarine "and soliciting their patronage". It
contains no expression of opinion on any subject, no protest
against official action or against interference with Chrestensen's business.
(b) On the reverse side of the same paper, Exhibit A, is
printed another handbill. It does not, in any way, refer to
the dispute with the police about the distribution of handbills, but consists of a protest against the refusal to let
Chr'estensen display his submarine at the City's dock.
There was thus no inherent relation between the handbill
printed on the face and this protest printed on the back of
Exhibit A. The latter was, without question, an expression
of opinion, the distribution of which, on the City streets,
could not constitutionally be prevented. This no one denies:
The City ordinance excepts such a handbill from its prohibition, and the police expressly told Chrestensen that he
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could separately distribute this "free speech" handbill,
without police restraint, if only it was separated from the
other handbill.
There was reason why he could not do so i he elected,
instead, to have both handbills printed on one piece of
paper. The two circulars are not Siamese twim;. A$ they
are unrelated in subject matter, they could easily have been
divided without injury to either. N otbing in the majority
opinion even intimates the contrary, even sugge~h~ that
there is anything but a printer's or naper connection between the two.
Since this purely paper tie is solely the result of the arbitrary choice of their common author, Chrestensen, he bas
no standing to assert that we must consider that what the
printer has joined no man can put asunder, that we mUHt,
artificially, regard the two handbills as inseparable wben
[fo1. 46] we are asked to exercise the delicate judicial power
of nullifying legislation. It is as if the suit related to·a
handbill advertising an automobile for sale which alHo included an attack on Nazism or a protest against the tax 011
cigarettes. Consequently, if we proceed on the principal
assllIllption of the majority opinion, i. e., that the ordinance
is invalid in so far as it prevents the distribution of anything other than an outright and unmixed commercial handbill, we should completely ignore the separable and independent "free speech" circular on the back of Exhibit ~1,
and consider the case pl'ecisely as if Chrestensen had been
denied permission to distribute merely a handbill containing nothing except what is printed on the face of that paper.
Thus considered, the issue narrows to this: Is that separable
handbill, on the face of Exhibit A, wholly commercia11
That it is wholly commercial is, to my mind, manifest:
At the outset, it is essential to note that Chrestem~en \; purpose or motive in proposing to distribute his odp;inal handbill, Exhibit 1 which he withdrew and for which he I:\ubstituted the matter on the face of Exhibit .A.. is admitted
to have been frankly and completely commercial. There i~
a presumption that, at least for a short interval, a man 'H
purpose or motive continues the same. And so atl to Chrestensen. 1 That in the distinct and separable "free speech"
-,," ,

"Motive is a persuasive interpreter" even of Hequivo(»"f conduct' '. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Ry. Clerks, 281
U 'So 548, 559.
1
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handbill, printed on the reverse' of Exhibit A,. Chrestensen
had a quite different motive or purpose, surely does not
overcome that presumption.
And there is no other evidence to overcome it. Contrariwise, the record reenforces the presumption. Here we must
turn to the stipulation of facts on which, as the majority
opinion points out, the District Court exclusively relied
when entering its final decree. There was no trial at which
the testimony of witnesses was heard. We must assume,
[fol. 47] therefore, that, if there had been such a trial, the
City would have offered testimony conclusively proving"and that the trial court on that basis would have foundthe following facts set forth explicitly in that stipulation
of facts:
"5. Defendant, or his agents, by threatening to enforce
the health regulation against plaintiff, has restrained plaintiff from distributing in the streets and other public places
of the City of New York, copies of a certain handbill >I« * *
a copy of which is attached to the Bill of Complaint and
marked 'Plaintiff's Exhibit A' * * *
"6. Handbill A bears on the face thereof oommeroial or
business advertising matter informing the public of the
location of plaintiff's exhibit and solioiting their patronage.
"7. The reverse side of handbill ,A oontains, not commercia~ or business advertising matter, but rather a publio
protest against the conduct of the New York City Department of Docks in denying plaintiff wharfage facilities at
piers owned by New York Oity and situated at the Battery.

"S. Plaintiff had earlier, on or about June 29, 1940, prepared a handbill, hereinafter called handbill No.1, a C0PY
of which is attached hereto and marked 'Defendant's Exhibit l' and by this reference made a part hereof.
"The defendant, or his agents, informed the plaintiff that
the distribution of handbill No.1 would be a violation of
the park and health regulations but that plaintiff could distribute handbills which contained only information Ol' a
public protest.
, 'Plaintiff thereupon revised handbill No. 1 by removing
from the face of it certain advertising matter and by printing on the reverse side of the handbill a public protest,
which revised handbill is handbill A.

,
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[fol.48]

"Qn being shown a printer's proof of handbill A,
defenda;nt, or his agents, advised plaintiff' that the P1'otCSt
matter on the reverse side thereof C02tld be distributed withO~bt police restraint, if separated fro'tJt the co'rMne1'cial ad-

vertising matter remaining

011-

the faoe thereof.

"Plaintiff caused handbill A to be printed with the Raid
protest matter appearing on the reverse side thereof, and
has not attempted to dist1"ibute said protest matter (lis-

associated front said comme1"cial advertising

mattet""

De-

fendant, or his agents, l'estrained the plaintiff from di~
tributing handbill A, as descl'ibed in paragraphs 5 and 9
hereof, and plaintiff thereupon brought this action.
"9. Defendant by threatening to enforce the park regulation against plaintiff has'· restrained plaintiff from displaying 'sandwichman' placards and from distributing copies
of handbill .A. upon streets and sidewalks adjacent and eOlltiguous to the central area of Battery Park, but within the
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Parks and possibly
'within the borders of the various tracts of land dedicated
for park purposes in the Battery Park area.

"10. The restrai11,ts described in paragraphs ;) and 9
-hereof have resulted, and their continuance 'Will 1'rs'ult, in
a dimi'l1/lbtio'}~ of the number of pef'son.s payi1b(J fees for a(lmission, to plaintiff's submarine. The net p1'ofits which
plaintiff would realize in the absence of said restraints
exoeed the sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000)." 2
Those stipUlated and uncontroverted facts taking the
place, I repeat, of inferences which we must assume would
irresistibly have been drawn from evidence which the City
presumably would have offered in" the absence of a stipulation leave no room for doubt, in my mind, that Exhibit A
[fol. 49J 'consists (1) of a purely commercial ha:ndbill set
forth in its face and (2) a separable free-speech handbill
3
on the back.
Italics are added.
3 The District Judge, indeed, reached that conclusion as
to Exhibit A in its entirety, in his opinion (rendered when
he entered his preliminary injunction) in which he said,
"The ordinance is clearly discriminatory against the business~:7while affording"protection to p~l'sons distributing
non- mmercial handbills ., .. .." 34 Fed. Supp. 596, 600.
2
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If Chre:stensen had taken the witness stand and testified,
without equivocation, that his intention with respect to matter on the face of the paper was wholly commercial as' contrasted with his intention as to the matter on the reverse
side, which was non-commercial, we would stultify ourselves
if we disregarded such evidence. I can perceive no difference between such testimony and the statement in the stipulation of facts, executed on Chrestensen's behalf, that Exhibit A bears on its face" commercial or business advertising matter' " while, on the other hand, "the reverse side
'" * oX- contains, not commercial or business advertising
matter, but rather a public protest * * *" Why should
we disregard Chrestensen's own interpretation of his two
distinct purposes 1
Moreover, in ascertaining his purpose, we may take judicial notice of the motives which commonly operate upon
human conduct; it has been said that human nature constitutes part of the evidence in every case; and that judges
are supposed to be acquainted with the ordinary sentiments
4
of the people among whom they live. "We take judicial
cognizance of all matters of general knowledge", said the
Supreme Court.5 And if a court may judicially notice that
many men postpone being shaved until Sunday,6 of the characteristics of the game of ping pong,7 and of horse races,s of
[fo1. 50] how shoe-shining parlors are run,9 of the reliance
of waiters on tips from patrons,lO of the end of the yachting
season,l1 of the kicking propensities of mules,12 we should
not confess that we are so cloistered that we do not know
•

423 C. J. 149, notes 9, 10, 11.
5 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 421.
6 State v. Petit, 74 Minn. 376, 77 N. W. 225 aff'd. 177 U. S.
164.
7 U. S. v. Strauss, 136 F. 185.
8 Weber v. Ohicago, 50 IlL A. 110, aff'd. 148 IU. 313, 36
N. E. 70.
9 Barlin v. Knox Oounty, 136 Tenn. 238, 188 S. W. 795.
10 Sloat v. Rochester Taxicab Co., 163 N. Y. S. 904, aff'd.
221 N. Y. 491, 116 N. E. 1076.
11 The Conquerer, 166 U. S. 110.
12 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Pratt, 169 Ky. 464, 18~ S. W.
369.

.
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that the dominant purpose of most men, 'UJhe1~ engaged in
b1('siness, is to seek customers and make profits. There is no
cynicism in that observation: While the average American
is by no means an economic man, yet his economic strivings,
at those moments when he is functioning as a business man,
are entirely legitimate; and it would be unwise for judges
to be so naive as to ignore them. According-Iy, Chrestensen
being a business man, we are more than justified in concluding that, as his sale purpose in connection with his original
handbill was unquestionably commercial, his purpose in
trying to distribute the handbill found on the face of Exhibit A was the same. We know that his business is that
of showing his submarine for profit; we know that, if members of the public appeared, in response to the irlYitation in
that handbill, they would be charged admissiOl1 i we lOlo,,,
that that is why Chrestensen wanted them to appear i we
know that he does not display his submarine for educational
or propaganda purposes. Why, then, should we refuse to
recogl1ize that the handbill in question was commercial'
To be sure, there have been cases, cited in the majority
opinion, 13 where one handbill contains two purposes which
so inextricably penetrate one another so as to make fission
impossible or impracticable; in that event, if the dominant
purpose is non-commercial, the ordinance, in order to preserve ~ts constitutionality, would be so interpreted as not
[fol. 51] to bring the handbill within its scope.14 But that
is not this case, for there is no evidence here of mixed motives aa to the handbill on the face of Exhibit A.lo There
is, therefore, no reason for our discussing problems not now
before us relating to mixed purpose handbills i the Supreme
Court, since the beginnings of our government, has wisely
, ,

"

,

People v. Young, 308 147; People v. Taylor, 85 Pac.
(2d) 978.
14 See People v. Loring and Green, unreported, but noted
in 1 Int'!. Juridical Ass'n. Bull. No. 12, p. 2, where the ordinance was held inapplicable to a leaflet announcing a meeting and specifying the price of admission.
15 The other "free speech" handbill, on the reverse side
of the paper, does advise the public to visit the submarine.
It might be argued that this showed a partial commercial
purpose. But the city conceded that that separable handbill was freely distributable, if separated.
13
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refused to cross imaginary bridges. 16 We should not be
disturbed because, in the future, cases may arise where
there will be some difficulty in ascertaining the primary purpose in distributing a handbill, and, because, when such
cases arise, the courts may not be able to stop at locating'
merely the north and south poles of the subject matter, but
may be required to do a more precise job of legal map-making and to fix a definite equatorial line. Where to draw such
lines "is the question in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law", Mr. Justice Holmes often notedP As he
said, some forty years ago,18 "In our approach towards exactness we constantly tend to work out definite lines or
equators to mark distinctions which we first notice as a difference of poles. It is evident in the beglnning that there
[fo1. 52] must be differences in the legal position of infants
and adults. In the end we establish twenty-one as the dividing point. There is a difference manifest at the outset between night and day. The statutes of Massachusetts fix the
dividing points at one hour after sunset and one hour before sunrise, ascertained according to mean time. When he
has discovered that a difference is a difference of degree,
that distinguished extremes have between them a penumbra
in which one gradually shades into the other, a tyro thinks
to puzzle you by asking where you are going to draw the
line, and an advocate of more experience will show the arbi•

Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346; Cf. Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, Concurring opinion in
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460.
17 Irwin v. Gavitt, 268 U. S. 161, 168; cf. Superior Oil Co.
v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390; Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan,
274 U. S. 473, 478; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 631632; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 241; Louisville
Gas .& Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 41; Quaker
City Cab Co. v' Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 403; Nash v .
United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376; Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240
U. S. 625, 630, 631. See Oardozo, The Nature of the J udicial Process (1921) 46; The Paradoxes of Legal Science
16

•

(1928) 62.

Law in Science Science in Law, Collected Legal Papers (1920) 210, 232-233 (reprinted from 12 Harv. L. Rev.
[1899] 443); Cf. Holmes, The Oommon Law (1881) 127,
18

110, 68 .
•
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trariness of the line proposed by putting cases very near
to it on one side or the other. But the theory of the law is
that such lines exist, because the theory of the law as to any
possible conduct is that it is either lawful or unlawful. As
that difference has no gradation about it, when applied to
shades of conduct that are very neal' each other, it has an
arbitrary look. We like to disguise the arbitrariness, w'e
like to save ourselves the trouble of nice and doubtful discriminations". Nevertheless, on occasions, the courts must
and do take that trouble. They have done so recently, with
great frequency, in the field of taxation. Cf. Harrison
v. Schaffner,
U. S.
(1941).
Difficulties, far greater than those here confronting us,
involved in ascertaining a dominant intent, purpose or
motive, or in disentangling mixed intentions, purposes or
motives, have not heretofore deterred the courts from doing
so; they have not found it impossible to answer such questions as that which perplexes my colleagues, i. e., "How
much is 'primarily' 1"; they have not failed to make wba t
the majority somewhat invidiously calls "refined distinctions". Thus, to cite but one example, although a statute
is itself constitutional, its enforcement will be enjoined
where a court, on the basis of elaborate evidenee extrjnsic
[fol. 53] to the statute, finds operative in its actual administration a discriminatory purpose or motive of an uncou10
stitutional kind. In such cases, the purpose or motive is
not, as the majority opinion suggests, determined by any
subtle or occult" subjective" test.
And especially in the instant case there need be no judicial anguish in drawing a line, and no occasion for psychological probings of Chrestensen's mental interior in
order to ascertain what he was after, when endeavoring' to
distribute the matter on the face of Exhibit A: His original
purpose, the contents of his stipulation of facts, his complaint that the enforcement of the City's ordinance diminished the number of persons paying fees for admission

,

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373, 374; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision, 284 U. S. 23, 28; Norris
v. A.labama, 294 U. S. 587. For other illustrations. cf.
Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev.
(1894), Collected Legal Papers (1920) 117; Paul, Selected
Studies in Taxation, Second Series (1938) 255 ff.
10
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so as to cause him a loss of profits in excess of $3,000,2°
are ample objective indicia of a commercial purpose with
reference to the separable handbill printed on the front of
Exhibit A. A shrinking from the use of such evidence is
of a piece with the hostility to the employment of so-called
"circumstantial evidence" which our court recently conFed. (2d) demned in F. W. Woolworth v. N. L. R. B.,
(C. C. A. 1941) ; we there said that "courts, * ~ * in
a multitude of cases, must rely upon such evidence i. e.,
inferences from testimony as to attitudes, acts and deeds;
where such matters as purpose, plan, designs, motives,
intent, or similar matters, are involved, the use of such
inferences is often indispensable. Persons engaged in unlawful conduct seldom write letters or make public pro[fo1. 54] nouncements explicitly stating' their attitudes or
objectives; the evidence does not come in packages labelled
'Use me', like the cake, bearing the words 'Eat me', which
Alice found helpful in Wonderland".
Suppose that a department store, whose owners were recognized as not being in business for their health, were to
attempt to distribute, on the streets, a handbill saying
nothing but. this: "We have on display at our store many
copies of beautiful early American furniture". If the
store owners sought an injunction to restrain the city from
preventing the distribution on the streets of such an advertisement, a court surely would not grant the injunction
because the handbill itself contained nothing which disclosed a commercial intention. It would not say that, as
the advertisement was silent as to sales, it must be assumed
that there was little or no profit motive behind it, but merely
a desire to educate. The judicial vision is not so feeble
that it cannot look beyond the contents of such a paper.
And yet that is the attitude of the majority in Chrestensen's
case.
Even if it were true that federal jurisdictioRrequired
such an allegation, that would not serve to diminish the significance of that complaint as to loss of profits. For the
Constitutional objection could as well have been raised in
the state court. Moreover, it is highly doubtful whether
such an allegation was necessary in this case to ensure
federal jurisdiction. See Hague v. C. 1. 0., 307 U. S. 496,
508.
20
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It is a strange and novel doctrine that his intention must
be discovered without any reference to data not found in
the document itself, that even his own explicit statement
of his intention, contained in the stipulation, cannot be
looked at. Except where the parole evidence rule of the
Statute of Frauds is applicable, judges have not heretofore
disclosed such timidity, have not denied themselveH the mole
of those usual objective means of ascertaining intention
which are open to ordinary men.
The majority opinion, however, suggests tha t if the (',ourLS
were to sanction the use of such evidence extrinsic to the
document, the result would be that the City's police officers
would become the "arbiters" of the citizen's intention, with
a consequent arbitrary power, not reviewable by the court.'4,
to interfere with the distribution of free speech handbills.
Of course, that cannot be true. Whatever may be the 11l!.:'U11S
[fol. 55] employed by city officials to determine whether a
handbill is commercial, the courts are open to the citizen
who believes that the City's official's decision is incorrect.
I cannot, however, believe it necessary or propel' for the
courts to attempt to prevent any possible abuRe of official
power by holding that legislation is unconstitutional which
confers upon officials the legitimate exercise of Ruch power.
Nothing in the Constitution justifies such conduct by the
judiciary; a constitution which gave judges that kind of
authority, and which they exercised, would caUHe that
paralysis of government and that condition of nnarc.hy,
leading ultjmately to despotism, which our Constitution, so
The Federalist tells us, was designed to preyent. 21
2. The majority, in its opinion, however, strongly intimates that if it had concluded that this case related solely•
to a wholly commercial circular, it would nevel'thelesH hav('
held the ordinance unconstitutional. In other words, the
majority finds it difficult to see why (a) if, as is without
doubt true, a business man may not constitutionally be
prevented from cireularizing', in public places, a proteRt
against official action affecting his business, he mm;t not
also (b) be similarly protected in distributing business circulars wholly designed to procure public patronagl for
profit. Both, the majority sug'gests, are protected by the

•

l

,

,

.

,

Cf. The Federalist (Earle's edition, 1937) No. 70 (p.
454); cf. No. 68 (p. 444) and No. 51 (p. 337).
21

,
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constitutional principle of free speech which paralyzes or
numbs the City's so-called "police power". I cannot agree.
Constitutional, like other legal principles, do not dwell
a la Robinson Crusoe, or in an anarchic state of nature
where there is a war of all ag'ainst all; they must learn to
live with one another, sociably, in a sort of democracy of
ideas in which none is dictator. Thus, for example, due
process, although it must yield somewhat when it ·encoun[fo1. 56] tel's the war power, or the power to exclude aliens,
22
or the bankruptcy power, is still not impotent.
There need, therefore, be no ruthless dogma fight to a
finish between the city's so-called "police power" (exercisable for the group welfare) and the constitutional right of
the individual to free speech and free expression of ideas.
It has been recognized, since at least the time of Aristotle,
that it is dangerous to give anyone principle its head, to
regard it as an absolute, to let it work its way out, uncurbed,
23
to its extreme logical limit.
We must, rather, regard
principles as each expressing a general tendency to be
reconciled with other such, principles. "To bring about reconciliations" of legal principles is "the great role of
jurists"; their task, in the face of contradictory principles,
is that of" cutting out a little here and a little there * * 'r
As Montesquieu observed, 'despots alone try to govern
everything with a general scheme and a rigid will' 'iI- * *
The contradictory elements frequently found in problems
*' * * throw us into a regime of concession or compromise * * * Thus we reach that middle ground which
is all that we can hope for in this world".24
See Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 589,
note 19.
23 Hudson Water 00. v. McCarter, 209U. S. 349, 355.
24 Demogue, Analysis of Fundamental Nations (Modern
French Legal Philosophy, in the Modern Legal Philosophy
Series, 1921) 570, 413, 394.
"All ideas of truth are false, that is, contradictory and
irrational, if one attaches to them an exclusive and absolute meaning; they are all verities, that is susceptible of
realization and utility, if they are viewed in relation to
others, or in evolution". Proudhon, PhilosQphie Du
Progres (1868) 22, quoted by Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L. J. (1927) 1039, 1041, note 2.
22
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Nor should that distress us. For compromise is the very
essence of living. Wailing is a compromise between falling
down and standing' up j sleep is a compromise between full
vitality and death. All compromises are not evil 01' foolish.
There is an obvious distinction between intelligent, courage[fo1. 57] ous compromjse or adjustment and cowardly
appeasement. Our Oonstitution, as every school boy knows,
is a set of compromises. Government in a democracy i:-; constantly engaged in a series of experiments in achieving compromises; 25 its aim is, 01' should be, almost always to find a
middle ground; if such a government tends, in some respects, to be less flexible in war-time, that, too, is but a
temporary compromise with the basic tenets of a democracy
26
in order to preserve them.
"

Loa

,",,'

,'".

•

Cf. Mr. Justice Douglas, Democracy and Finance (1940)
240 ff. 260 ff.
25

In Chappell v. Ellis, 123 N. C. 259, 31 S. E. 709 (1898) the
court said that "we feel compelled to carry out a principle
only to its necessary and logical results, and not to ib; furthest theoretical limit, in disregard of other essential
principles. The one universal law of nature is that all action,
animate as well as inanimate, is the result of conflicting
forces. The orbit of the earth depends upon the exquisite
adjustment of two conflicting forces, the centripetal power
of attraction, and the centrifugal force of momentum. The
preponderance of either would lead to inevitable destruction. The trajectory of every shot is governed by three opposing forces, momentum, friction, and gravitation j for
speed with which it leaves the gun, the resistance of the atmosphere, and the attraction of the earth. It is HO with
human action. Government itself is recognized as springing from the love of personal liberty, on the one hand, and
the desire for personal protection, on the other. It is said
that their just equilibrinm produces a government of liberty
without license, and of law without tyranny, but that its disturbance would lead to anarchy or to despotism. We do not
feel at liberty to adopt anyone prineiple as the sole guide of
our decisions, and to carry it out to extreme and dangerous
limits, regardless of other great principles of justice and
of law, so firmly established by reason and precedent."
26 Article 1, section 9 of the Constitution expressly provides that the privilege of habeas corpus may be suspended
""""'1""'
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Absolutists Slleer at compromises; "they are the Gordian
knot-cutters; they may undo the knot, but they ruin the
rope"; life, they think, "can be folded neatly down the midcUe, with all the good on one side, all the bad on the other,
[fo1. 58] and everything is accounted for * * *" 27 As
Morley said, "The disciples of the relative may afford to
compromise. The disciples of the absolute, never,'.28 Even
Hobbes, generally (although perhaps erroneously) regarded
as an extreme absolutist, said that "in a way beset with
those that contend, on one side for too great liberty, and on
the other side, for too much Authority, 'tis hard to pass between the points of both unwounded * * * For as long
as every man holdeth this Right of doing anything he liketh,
so long are men in the condition of War." 29
The right of free speech and free expression, because of
our history, is one of our fundamental liberties, singularly
well protected,so it, therefore, comes as near to creating an
absolute principle as any fostered by our Constitution. S!
And, particularly today, freedom of expression is a value
which Americans should dearly cherish. For it is our chal•• , =

•

•
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when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it; and see Amendment 5 as to presentment or indictment of a grand jury. Cf. Mr. Justice Reed's suggestion, in Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Co., 312 U. S. 281.,
320; "Free speech may be absolutely prohibited only under
the most pressing national emergencies. These emergencies
must be of the kind that justify the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus or the suppression of the right of'trial by
jury".
27 Hayakawa, Language in Action (1941) 133,126.
28 Oompromise, 44.
29 Leviathan (1651), dedicatory letter and p. 65.
30 Schneider v. State., 308 U. S. 147, 161.
310hief Justice Stone suggests that the usual presumption of constitutionality is restricted in scope when legisla~
tion appears on its face to offend the specific provisions in
the first ten amendments' 'which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth". U. S. v.
Oarolene Products Co., .304 U. S. 144, 152 n. Of. Hamilton
and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court,
50 Yale L. J.1319, 1352 ff.
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lenge to dictatorship and its vaunted efficiency. Desirable
social adjustments, as well as increased efficiency in industry, derive from new ideas; and new ideas will be stifled,
even in the minds of tp.eir originators r if not given expression; the uncommunicated thought is usually still-born. We
may rejoice that there is embodied in our Constitution a belief that (to quote our wise and eloquent Senior Circuit
Judge) "where heterodoxy in what men prize most is a
crime, fresh thinking about anything will disappear", a
[fol. 59] "faith that our collective fate in the end depends
upon the irrepressible fertility of the individual • • • , , 32
But even the principle of free speech is not an absolute;
aa
it has its limitations.
Thus one may commit a crime, or
be guilty of an actionable wrong, if he wantonly shouts
"fire" in a crowded theater; or utters certain kinds of unM
truths or, in some circumstances, even truths.
And,
while the City's "police power" must give ground before
the right of free speech, that power, although then
chastened, is not utterly destroyed; the Supreme Court
merely says that, in that event, the power must be used
plmitively and after the fact by fining or jailing those who
abuse the privilege and not preventively. Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147, 148.
However, the historical events which yielded the constitutional protection of free speech and free expression do not
by any means compel or even suggest the conclusion that
there is an equally important constitutional right to distribute commercial handbills for the purpose of profitmaking so imperative that the City's "police power"
must similarly be reduced (from prevention to punishment
after the fact) when pieces of paper, devised for business
purposes, may litter its streets to the injury of public health
or safety. Were the concept of free expression so extensive
Learned Hand, Liberty, 4 Yale Alumni Magazine (1941)
10, 12.
3a Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160; of. Gorin v.
United States, 312 U. S. 19.
84 American Bank & Trust Company v. Federal Bank, 256
U. S. 350, 358; Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 Harv.
L. Rev. (1894) 1, Collected Legal Papers (1920) 117.
32
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in scope, the o'(1tdoor advertising and billboard cases 35
would be inexplicable; surely the recent "free speech" de~
[fol. 60J cisions of the Supreme Court are not to be read as
over-ruling those precedents. In Schneider v. People, 308
U. S. 147 (1939), when upholding the right to distribute
leafiets, as in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444,452 (1937), the
Court was referring to "historic weapons in the defense of
liberty" such as "the pamphlets of Thomas Paine". And
the Oourt has recently described those cases, and Hague v.
C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 396 (1939), as "concerned with restrictions cutting off appropriate means through which, in a free
society, the processes of popular rule may effectively function"; Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 599,
note 6 (1940).36
.
Such men as Thomas Paine, John Milton and Thomas
Jefferson were not fighting for the right to peddle commercial advertising. That is not at all to decry the profitmaking zeal of the American business man. I, for one,
would not refer, as the majority does, to a "commercial
taint". For, as ours is a profit economy, no business man
need apologize for seeking personal gain by all legitimate
means. But the constitutional limitations on legislation
affecting such pursuits are not as specific and exacting as
those imposed on ,legislation interfering with free speech.
To prevent the peddling of business handbills on the street
still leaves the businessman at liberty to use other modes
37
of advertising, as in newspapers, for instance.
I most heartily agree with the statements in the majority
opinion that the right of free speech is no "more applicable
to group protest for abstract religious or political principles
than to individual protests for concrete business injuries"
.

,..

Fifth Avenue Coach 00. v. New York City, 221 U. S. 467
(1911); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105 (1932). See
also Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U. S.
230, 243-244 (1915); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229
U. S. 288, 313-316 (1912) ; cf. Stromberg v. California, 283
U. S. 359, 369 (1931) with Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34
35

(1907).

Italics in the quotation are added.
31 A discrimination which favors newspaper advertising
is not unconstitutional. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S.
36

105 (1932).
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and that "the expression in public places by handbill or
circular" cannot be "forbidden to the businessman who
would make a protest against official mistreatment of bbnself in his business affairs". But it is one thing thus to say
[fol. 61] that a protest by a businessman against mistreatment of himself in business affairs must be regarded as COllstitutionally protected free speech and quite another to say
the same of the businessman's circulars advertising for
business. For the right of free speech guaranteed by the
Constitution is the right to disseminate opinion; the protection accorded to tbis right, which renders invalid any
effort to prohibit the distribution of free speech documel1ts,
should not be extended to commercial advertisements simply
because the word "speechD, taken alone, includes both social
s8
and business discourse.
I can find neither reason nor authority for such an extension. So to amplify the constitutional guaranty would be
D
to "thingify" the words "free speech and "free expression", and to become forgetful of the vital ideas "the defense of liberty" and the functioning of "the processes of
30
popular rule" for which they stand.
The danger of
converting words into thought-paralyzing entities is illustrated by the judicial history of the phrase' 'liberty of contract". Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905)
with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 391394 (1937).40 The Supreme Court recently reminded us
that such "tags are not instruments of adjudication but
statements of result in applying the constitutional test
* * .. Ambiguous intimations of g-eneral phrases in opinions torn from the significance of concrete circumstances
""
'II
.,
do not alter the limited nature of the function"
of the courts ., Ii< • "We must be on our guard against
imprisoning" the powers of the states and their subdivi[fol. 62] sions "within formulas that are not compelled by
the Oonstitution but merely represent judicial generaliza.

,

One is reminded of the librarian who, in his catalogue,
put' 'Mill on Liberty" and followed this notation by "Ditto
on the Floss".
39 Holmes, Law in Science· .science in Law, Collected
Legal Papers, supra, 238, 230-232.
(0 See discussion of those cases in Hume v. J\{oore-~{cCormack Lines, Inc.,
Fed. (2d)
(0. C. A. 2, 1941).
38
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tions exceeding the concrete circumstances wIDch they profess to summarize". Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney, 311 U. S.
435, 444-445. Particularly when we are asked to exercise
the high judicial prerogative of holding legislation unconstitutional, we should resist the seductive power of words,
of which Ingraham has given the classic illustration: "We
do no~ often", he writes,41 "have occasion to speak, as an
indivisible whole, of the group of phenomena involved in
or connected with the transit of a Negro over a rail fence
with a watermelon under his arm when the moon is just
passing under a cloud. But if this collocation of phenomena
were of frequent occurrence, and if we did have occasion
to speak of it often, and if its happening were likely to
affect the money market, we should have some name such
as 'Wousin' to denote it by. People would in time be disputing whether the existence of a vVousin involved necessarily a rail fence, an~ whether the term could be applied
when a white man is similarly related to a stone wall". The
principle of free speech should not be demeaned by turning
it into a W ousin.
It may be that the majority was affected by an argument,
advanced by Chrestensen, that, because the ordinance permits the free circularization of non-commercial handbills,
which have no less a capacity to litter the streets, it is in
violation of the "equal protection" clause of the Constitution. But that clause does not prohibit a reasonable classification; and it is well established that, if there is a rational
basis for a classification, the legislature may select for correction a particular one out of several similar evils. Sproles
v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 396. Apart from that, here the
classification is one established by the Constitution itself.
Once it is admitted that non-commercial handbills are, con[fo1. 63] stitutionally outside the scope of the so-called
police power, it follows that legislation which operates only
on that part of the field which is left, i. e., commercial handbills, is employing the very classification imposed by the
Constitution itself. Accordingly, in Packer Corporation v.
Utah, 285 U. S. 105, the Supreme Court upheld a statute
prohibiting billboard advertising of tobacco, rejecting the
contention that it was' unreasonable to discriminate in favor
of newspaper advertising, which was protected because
Swain School Lectures 121, quoted in Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (2d ed.) 416.
41
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newspapers circulate in interstate commerce. The Court
said: "The classification alleged to be arbitrary was made
in order to comply with the requirement of the Federal COllstitution as interpreted and applied by the highest court of
the State. Action by a .state taken to observe one prohibition of the Constitution does not entail the violation of
another [citing cases]". Cf. also J. E. Raley & Brothers v.
Richardson, 264 U. S. 157, 160.
There remains a contention advanced by appellee against
the ordinance which the majority opinion does not consider,
but which, because I regard the ordinance valid, I must discuss: The ordinance expressly prohibits only commercial
advertising and does not mention a dual purpose document
of the kind before us. Aside from the fact that, in applying
the statute as it did, the City was engaged in a propel' administrative fuuction, I would not interpret the statute to
permit the distribution of such an artificial hybrid as this,
since that would, by pointing the way to easy evasion,
utterly destroy the efficacy of the prohibition. The ordinance, as originally enacted, did not expressly exempt commercial handbills, but such an exemption was read into it
in 1921 by People v. Johnson, 117 Misc. 133, to avoid a conflict with the New York Constitution. This judicial construction, of course, carved out of the statute's realm only
handbills which were constitutionally protected. In 1938,
an express exemption of non-commercial advertising was
[fo1. 64] added, presumably in response to Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U. S. 444, which held that a blanket ordinance was
"invalid on its face":t2 The legislative intention was
patently merely to exclude such a control of handbills as
would render the ordinance invalid under the Federal constitution. Clearly what was meant was that only handbills
not constitutionally subject to such regulation were not to
be included. Any handbill primarily commercial was to be
covered; and certainly a separable commercial handbill
was so included. That the courts should regard the obvious
legislative intention, and not thwart it by narrow construction, has been vigorously stated in recent decisions. See
United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S.
534, 543; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 489;
•

It is, of course, immaterial that the amendment, because of the established judicial construction of the statute,
may have been adopted out of an excess of caution.
42
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United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554, 562. Mr. Justice
Holmes, on Circuit, in Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed.
3'0, 32 (C. C. A. 1, 1908),48 said that "it is not an adequate
discharge of duty for the courts to say: 'We see what you
are driving at, but you have not said it ;; if; *'."
I conclude, therefore, that Chrestensen's paper includes
a separate outright commercial handbill; that that separate
handbill is within the prohibition of the ordinance; and that
the constitutional guaranty or free speech does not render
unconstitutional the prohibition of the distribution on the
Oity's streets of such a purely commercial advertisement
merely because it is deliberately coupled with a totally distinct and easily separable exercise of the privilege of free
speech.
[fo1. 65] UWITED STATES OIRCUIT OOURT OF ApPEALS, SECOND
OIROUIT
•

At a Stated Term of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals, in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United
States Courthouse in the Oity of New York, on the 19th
day or August one thousand nine hundred and forty-one.
Present: Hon. Thomas W. Swan, Hon. Oharles E. Clark,
Hon. Jerome N. Frank, Circuit Judges.
F. J. CHRESTENSEN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
LEWIS J. VALENTINE, Individually and as Police Commissioner of New York Oity, Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of New York
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record
from the District Oourt of the United States for the Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.
On Oonsideration Whereof, it is now hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the decree of said District Court
be and it hereby is affirmed with costs.
.
43 Cited and quoted with approval in Keifer & K;eifer v.
R. F. 0.,306 U. S. 381, 391, note 4 (1939).
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It is further ordered that a Mandate issue to the said
District Court in accordance with this decree.
D. E. Roberts, Clerk.

[fol. 66] [Endorsed:] United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. F. J. Chrestensen v. Lewis J. Valentine, individually and as Police Commissioner of New
York City. Order for Mandate. United States Circuit
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Filed Aug. 19, 1941.
D. E. Roberts, Clerk.
[fol. 67] Clerk's Certificate to foregoing transeript omitted in printing.
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[fol. 68]

SUPREME OOURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ORDER ALLOWING CERTIORARI.

Filed November 24, 1941

The petition herein for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Circuit Oourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
granted.
And it is further ordered that the duly certified copy of
the transcript of the proceedings below which accompanied
the petition shall be treated as though filed in response to
such writ.
.am"

Endorsed on Cover: File No. 46,035, U. S. Oircuit Oourt
of Appeals, Second Circuit. Term No. 707. Lewis J. Valentine, Individually and as Police Commissioner of the
Oity of New York, Petitioner, vs. F. J. Chrestensen. Petition for a writ of certiorari and exhibit thereto. Filed
October 21, 1941, Term No. 707 O. T.1941.
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